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ERADICATING WOMEN’S SURNAMES:
LAW, TRADITION, AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY
DEBORAH ANTHONY
INTRODUCTION
“My name is my identity and must not be lost.” -Lucy Stone
In explaining her reasoning for retaining her birth name after marrying Henry 
Blackwell in 1855, Lucy Stone, the first known American woman to keep her surname after 
marriage, fastened on a concept both implicitly and explicitly acknowledged in the annals 
of history: the symbolic nature of names and their centrality to one’s individuality and 
identity.1 She resisted what was understood to be the fundamental and essential tradition of 
wives adopting the husbands’ surname after marriage, a tradition so fundamental as to be 
considered unassailable, even perhaps divinely ordained. Stone also gained the distinction 
of being the first woman denied the right to vote by reason of her name choice.2 Even into 
the twenty-first century, the practice is considered one of the most fundamental aspects of 
traditional marriage, dating back to to the origins of surnames themselves, which lends it 
a kind of mystical legitimacy. Yet, the historical record of surnames tells quite a different 
story. 
English surname usage prior to the seventeenth century was not only variable, but 
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1  ashlyn K. Kuersten, women and the law: leaders, Cases, and doCuments 19 (2003). This statement 
became the motto of the Lucy Stone League formed by Ruth Hale in 1921.
2  Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Problem That Has No Name, 4 Cardozo women’s l.J. 321, 353 (1998). 
Although her denial was before women gained the right to vote nationally with the Nineteenth Amendment in 
1920, Massachusetts had granted women the right to vote in school committee elections in 1879. MassMoments.
org, November 2, 1915: Voters Deny Massachusetts Women the Vote, https://www.massmoments.org/moment-
details/voters-deny-massachusetts-women-the-vote.html [https://perma.cc/48DY-EY9P].
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the practice for women bore little resemblance to the typical “traditional” practices seen 
in modern-day England and the United States. Women in England, like men, once held 
individualized surnames reflecting personal traits, occupations, or family relations.3 When, 
centuries later, surnames began to be passed down to descendants, women often retained 
their own names after marriage, and were as likely as men to pass on those names to their 
children and grandchildren, and even at times to their husbands.4 This surname flexibility, 
when considered with other historical evidence, suggests a more complex and nuanced status 
for women in English history than is typically acknowledged. Indeed, what we consider 
to be traditional when it comes to naming practices (i.e. women assuming the names of 
the husbands, and children those of the fathers) is in fact a relatively recent phenomenon 
rather than a product of ancient English practice. For roughly 800 years, English women 
underwent an extended period of decline in rights and status, with the most pronounced 
and abrupt shifts taking place in the early modern period beginning about the middle of 
the seventeenth century. That state of affairs became the foundational status quo at the 
establishment of the American colonies and eventually the new nation. 
The advent of the Enlightenment, as well as the political creation of the nation-state 
and the advancement of colonialism and imperialism in the early modern period, brought 
about new notions of citizen and non-citizen, self and other. These concepts were employed 
to reinforce a patriarchal regime which deceptively claimed that the natural order, common 
sense, long history, and divine right supported the current male-oriented surname system in 
its creation of new systems of rights and identity. Strikingly, however, the collective social 
consciousness failed to acknowledge these developments. Instead, the older norms were 
wiped clean from collective memory and the new practices, being critical to maintaining 
the new dominant social status quo, were made “traditional.” When new modern and strictly 
gendered practices emerged, they quickly became so entrenched and political that both 
social and legal mechanisms sprang up to enforce them. Courts justified restrictive decisions 
about women’s surnames by reference to a “tradition” so fundamental and absolute that it 
merited legal coercion despite nearly a millennium of common law and empirical evidence 
to the contrary.5 Today, while women in British and American society possess formal legal 
surname equality, sex-based naming conventions not only persist, but are also still enforced 
in certain ways via public policy.6
3  See discussion infra Section I. A History of Surnames in Anglo-American Culture.
4  See id.
5  See discussion infra Section III.A. Tradition and Law: A Reciprocal Interaction.
6  See id.
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The law often draws its principles from custom and practice, and justifies itself by 
reference thereto. Yet conversely, the law also works to support or discourage certain social 
practices, and changing the law is often the first step in altering societal perceptions and 
practice. It is not altogether surprising, then, that few couples deviate from the customary 
surname practice at marriage when the law has explicitly and implicitly worked against 
such a choice for the past few centuries; the current framework formally and informally 
prefers inegalitarian naming conventions. The fact that policy and law make resisting social 
trends more difficult speaks to our continuing patriarchal tendencies and our conceptions 
of family, identity, and values.
Surnames, once a fluid and variable convention in which women were often represented 
separate and apart from the men in their lives, became rigidly enforced as involuntary 
markers upon them through a variety of mechanisms, including social pressure, public 
policy practices, and legal decisions beginning in the nineteenth century in the United 
States. These cases referenced “tradition” going back centuries, perhaps even all the way 
to the birth of western civilization, but in reality judges were constructing their own version 
of history. This manipulation of the historical record and the common law was then used 
to promote concrete and compulsory policy, case law, and, occasionally, statutory law. The 
relationship between social custom and the common law is thus revealed to be dynamic, 
mutually constitutive, and, at times, contrived. Perceived traditions sometimes carry with 
them heavy political meaning beyond what appears at face value, such that when they are 
disrupted, the ways in which we have situated ourselves within our culture are shaken and 
enforcement mechanisms rise up to right the status quo. This process is not accidental; it 
is political. 
There is a presumption permeating modern life that societies always tend to move in 
the direction of progress, albeit not necessarily linearly, and sometimes in fits and starts. 
Wherever we stand today, it is certainly better than where we stood a generation ago, or 
a century, or many centuries. So invested are we in the idea that earlier periods could not 
have been more enlightened or advanced than modern society that we are inclined to reject 
as incorrect or anomalous any evidence to the contrary (while we are disinclined to search 
for such evidence in the first place). In the words of Herbert Hirsch, “[t]he idea of history 
as some inexorable process moving toward the perfection of the human species and an era 
of justice and tranquility is another of those figments of the human imagination wholly 
without precedent.”7 This tendency encourages a flawed or incomplete representation 
and study of history, which, in turn, serves to reinforce the same incomplete vision that 
7  Herbert Hirsch, GenoCide and the PolitiCs of memory: studyinG death to Preserve life 35 (1995).
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prompted it. This approach can be termed “chronological ethnocentrism.”8 It is clearly 
evident in the case of women’s surnames specifically, and the implications of that issue for 
their status more broadly.
The historical development of surname usage reveals a great deal about tradition, 
culture, and collective memory, and their mediation through the law and politics of a 
society. The politics of memory is a critical vantage point from which to interpret these 
developments, as the warping of tradition and collective memory served multiple political 
purposes in the cultivation of a national culture and identity that produced and supported 
pronounced gendered hierarchies in England and the United States. 
I. A History of Surnames in Anglo-American Culture
Cultural surname practices worldwide are quite variable, and United Status custom 
has certainly been influenced by diverse cultural practices and traditions. However, this 
Article focuses only on English history, primarily because the English common law was 
incorporated into the United States law and, as will be seen below, has had formal and 
concrete effects on the development of both custom and law in the United States regarding 
surnames.
Surnames entered the scene in England with the Norman Conquest of 1066; the 
previous Saxon culture utilized only given names.9 Surnames gradually spread throughout 
the region, becoming more commonly adopted and used by the population over the ensuing 
centuries.10 Multiple factors contributed to this trend, including the limited number of first 
names in use and the resulting difficulty in distinguishing individuals, the increase in 
government record-keeping and taxation and its attendant need to accurately identify and 
catalogue individuals, and the desire to more easily align and designate family estates and 
8  Jim Loewen, Our Real First Gay President, salon.Com (May 14, 2012), http://www.salon.
com/2012/05/14/our_real_first_gay_president/ [https://perma.cc/SKK7-2CQQ] (noting that chronological 
ethnocentrism allows the writers of history to “sequester bad things, from racism to the robber barons, in the 
distant past” allowing society to “‘know’ that everything turned out for the best.”).
9  Surnames were commonly known in English as bynames and functioned as second names. In this 
Article I use the term “surname” to include the concept of “byname,” and do not intend to limit the meaning 
of “surname” solely to an inherited family name. Peter McClure, Middle English Occupational Bynames as 
Lexical Evidence: A Study of Names in the Nottingham Borough Court Rolls 1303–1455, 108 transaCtions of 
the PhiloloGiCal soCiety 164, 164 (2010).
10  william dodGson bowman, the story of surnames 8 (1968).
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the inheritance systems that would perpetuate them.11 
Yet surnames at that time bore little resemblance to their modern forms. Up until 
around the seventeenth century, surname usage and adoption was a cultural practice 
that was flexible and inconsistent. Rather than being inherited from the father, surnames 
originally operated more as nicknames, assumed by common use: they might be chosen 
by the bearer or organically adopted by her or his acquaintances.12 They were a reflection 
of the name-holder’s occupation (e.g. Baker, Potter),13 personal or physical characteristics 
(e.g. Goodman, Armstrong), residence (e.g. Bridges, Hilton for hill town), or family (e.g., 
Richardson, Hughes). As such, they were functional and could change easily and often 
within a person’s lifetime. For instance, a young boy with very light hair might be called 
John Whitehead; after growing up and making carts for a living, he may be known as John 
Carter. Similarly, a person could be known by more than one surname simultaneously: one 
person may associate Robert with his father Thomas, calling him Robert Thomasson, while 
another knows him as Robert who lives by the wood, or Robert Wood. Members of the 
same family, therefore, often bore different surnames from each other.14 
One of the least-known aspects of historical surnames is the ways and frequency 
in which they were applied to and used by women and reflected various components of 
women’s lives. A great many historical records reveal that surnames relating specifically to 
women existed in various dynamic forms. Women regularly held individualized surnames 
that reflected their fathers (Stevendoghter,15 Tomdoutter,16 Rogerdaughter17); their mothers 
11  l. G. Pine, the story of surnames 11 (3d ed. 1970).
12  Talan Gwynek & Arval Benicoeur, A Brief Introduction to Medieval Bynames (1999), http://www.s-
gabriel.org/names/arval/bynames/ [https://perma.cc/T73U-6VK6].
13  Many occupational surnames that survive today are not recognized as such, either because they reflect 
a vocabulary that has since changed or because they represent occupations that no longer exist. For example, 
a “chandler” was a maker or seller of candles, a “draper” made or sold woolen cloth, while a “fuller” softened 
coarse material by pounding or walking on it, and was also known as a “walker.” A “foster” made scissors, a 
“sawyer” sawed wood, and someone who covered roofs with slate or tile was a “slater” or a “tyler.” A large 
number of modern English surnames descend from medieval occupations.
14  Cynthia Blevins Doll, Harmonizing Filial and Parental Rights in Names: Progress, Pitfalls, and 
Constitutional Problems, 35 how. l.J. 227, 228 (1992) (citing Smith v. U.S. Casualty Co., 90 N.E. 947, 948 
(N.Y. 1910)).
15  P.h. reaney & r.m. wilson, a diCtionary of enGlish surnames li (3d ed. 1997).
16  Daughters, id.
17  Id. at xviii.
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(Ibbotdoghter;18 Anotdoghter19); their occupations (Selkwimman (female dealer in silk),20 
Bredsellestere (female seller of bread),21 Vikerwoman (female servant of the vicar)22); or 
their familial status (Wedewe (widow),23 Moder (mother),24 Tomwyf (wife of Tom)25). 
Surnames of men often identified their mothers (Margretson,26 Elynoreson,27 Wideweson28); 
other female relatives (Marekyn (kinsman of Mary),29 Maggekin,30 Lovekin31); or their 
status with respect to a woman (Moderles (motherless),32 Mariman (servant of Mary)33). 
Oftentimes a woman’s given name would become the surname of her children or other 
relatives (Agnes,34 Marie,35 Edith,36 Helene37). Even when surnames became more commonly 
inherited from parents, around the fifteenth century, women were often the parent to pass 
down the surname to the children; there are many historical examples of married women 
18  Id. Ibb-ot is a diminutive Ibb, a pet form of Isabel. Ibbott, id.
19  Daughters, id. Annot is a diminutive of Ann. Annatt, id.
20  Silk, id.
21  P.h. reaney, the oriGin of enGlish surnames 84 (1967).
22  reaney & wilson, supra note 15, at li.
23  Peter franKlin, the taxPayers of medieval GlouCestershire: an analysis of the 1327 lay subsidy 
roll with a new edition of its text 62 (1993).
24  Mothers, reaney & wilson, supra note 15.
25  reaney, supra note 21, at 83.
26  Margretson, reaney & wilson, supra note 15.
27  Ellenor, id.
28  franKlin, supra note 23, at 107.
29  reaney & wilson, supra note 15, at xxxix.
30  Maggott, id. Magge is a pet form of Margaret.
31  Lovekin, id. Love is a female given name.
32  Motherless, id.
33  Mariman, id.
34  Agnes, id.
35  reaney & wilson, supra note 15, at xx.
36  franKlin, supra note 23, at 63.
37  Ellen, reaney & wilson, supra note 15.
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with surnames that differ from their husbands, whose children bear surnames matching the 
mother rather than the father.38 Other times children would be given a surname matching 
that of their grandmother, rather than either their mother or father.39 
With women regularly holding names reflecting their own status and characteristics, 
not only did they often retain those names after marriage and sometimes pass them on to 
their descendants, but they also, at times, passed their surnames on to their husbands.40 
This was usually done in an effort to attach the husband to the wife’s family estate and 
to ensure the continuity of the family line for purposes of property inheritance.41 Before 
coverture gained its strongest foothold, women’s property inheritance was commonplace. 
Even after inheritance restrictions became more rigid, there remained a tension between 
the older practices and the newer; property ownership became tied to surnames, but neither 
property nor surnames had yet come to inhere solely in the male. Women came to inherit 
less and less frequently as primogeniture became the rule, but when they did, their surnames 
continued to take precedence and were passed on to other family members. Examples 
can be found as late as the nineteenth century in England: in 1796 Henry Gough married 
Barbara Calthorpe and become Henry Calthorpe.42 In the early nineteenth century, Fysh 
Coppinger adopted his wife’s surname of de Burgh when they married, and their children 
and grandchildren took de Burgh as their surname as well.43 
While the frequency of these practices varied by period, region, and circumstance, 
these surname practices can be found in England as early as surnames first appeared, were 
in widespread use, and continued in the record for hundreds of years. They became less 
common in the seventeenth century, but the prevalence at which women’s surname usage 
continued to demonstrate their individual attributes rather than the names of their fathers 
or husbands, and supported a legacy where those names were passed on to children and 
38  See Deborah Anthony, To Have, to Hold, and to Vanquish: Property and Inheritance in the History 
of Marriage and Surnames, 4 br. J. am. leG. studies 218, 232–33 (2015) for further discussion of this. 
Alternatively, at times the child’s given name would match the mother’s surname.
39  Id. at 235.
40  Id.
41  See id. at 236 for further discussion of property, surnames, and marriage.
42  Administrative History, CalthorPe estate 1799–1899, London Metropolitan Archives Reference Code: 
E/CAL.
43  Administrative History, burGh, de family 1637–1937, London Metropolitan Archives Reference Code: 
ACC/0742.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law8 37.1
grandchildren, suggests that women possessed a social visibility and status, as well as an 
independent and autonomous legal identity in stark contrast with modern developments. 
II. Modern Surname Developments
The application of the legal principle of coverture in England had a significant effect 
on the status and public life of women, including their surnames. Coverture is the legal 
concept of a married woman falling under the authority of her husband without a legal 
identity of her own. It appeared in England relatively early—around the eleventh century, 
brought to the region by the Normans.44 Yet, what emerged in formal legal treatises did 
not manifest in everyday practice, as women continued to exercise considerable autonomy 
in public life.45 By about the eighteenth century, however, the rules of coverture became 
firmly embedded and strictly enforced within both private and public life.46 Women were no 
longer permitted to own property in their own right; where they had been inheriting fairly 
regularly until around the fourteenth century, inheritance rules now gave preference to males 
in the devising of property, even distantly related ones, over direct female descendants.47 
Exceptions to the principle became fewer and fewer over time. What women did manage to 
inherit or otherwise own was formally held by the husband to do with as he wished, with or 
without his wife’s consent.48 Women’s adoption of the husband’s surname became nearly 
universal during this period, and a family’s children nearly always took the name of their 
father.49 As a result, the many surnames that had existed that represented women largely 
disappeared, as it became only men’s names that were passed on to descendants and thereby 
became solidified in the modern naming framework. Nevertheless, a surprising number 
of matronymic surnames—those representing and passed down from women—have 
survived to this day, although they represent a small minority of the surnames currently in 
44  arianne ChernoCK, men and the maKinG of modern british feminism 91 (2010); Courtney stanhoPe 
Kenny, the history of the law of enGland as to the effeCts of marriaGe on ProPerty and on the wife’s 
leGal CaPaCity 11 (1879).
45  See Anthony, supra note 38, at 222–23.
46  See Deborah Anthony, Analyzing the Disappearance of Women’s Surnames and the Retrenchment of 
their Political-Legal Status in Early Modern England, 29 hastinGs women’s l. J. 7, 16–18 (2018).
47  See Anthony, supra note 38, at 227–228.
48  Ruth Kittel, Women Under the Law in Medieval England, in the women of enGland 127–128 (Barbara 
Kanner ed.,1979).
49  Some exceptions to this can be found even into the nineteenth century in England. See Anthony, supra 
note 38, at 233. The restrictions were more rigid in the United States.
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existence and are almost entirely unrecognized as originating from women. For example, 
the surname Madison means son of Maddy, which is a nickname for Maud; Marriott was 
a common diminutive of Mary, and its existence as a modern surname indicates that the 
name was passed down from a woman to a man, who then passed the name on to his own 
progeny, for it to remain in existence today. Many other examples of matronymic surnames 
likewise exist.50 
 It is important to note, however, that although many of these restrictions on 
women were enshrined in the common law of England, the law never formally required 
any particular application of surnames for either women or men. The English common 
law had always dealt with names as a matter of personal choice, allowing individuals to 
adopt and/or change their names as they wished for reasons other than fraud, even after the 
customary inheriting of names became firmly established.51 As the United States adopted 
the English common law in its legal framework, the same surname rules applied. Thus, as 
a technical legal matter, wives were not required to take their husbands’ names; yet, as will 
become apparent below, the practical application of the common law flexibility was quite 
a different matter. 
III. Tradition, Law, and the Making of Memory
A. Tradition and Law: A Reciprocal Interaction
The word tradition, from the Latin “handing over,” is defined by reference to inherited 
patterns of thought, behavior, belief, or custom that are commonly accepted as historical, 
creating a continuity in social attitude over time.52 Anthropologists studying tradition have 
noted that a society’s awareness of its traditions as such often results from situations in which 
palpable change is taking place, where tradition then becomes the conscious designation 
for cultural elements that are to be deliberately sustained in the face of such change.53 
Ironically, tradition is considered antithetical to modern society and yet is simultaneously 
50  See Deborah Anthony, In the Name of the Father: Compulsion, Tradition and Law in the Lost History of 
Women’s Surnames, 25 J. Juris. 59, 69–75 (2014).
51  Malone v. Sullivan, 605 P.2d 447, 448 (Ariz. 1980).
52  Tradition, merriam-webster online diCtionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
tradition [https://perma.cc/YDJ8-CXMR].
53  Nelson H. H. Graburn, What is Tradition?, 24 museum anthroPoloGy 6, 6 (2000).
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revered by it.54 That reverence is fragmentary, however; some traditions are conscientiously 
venerated while others are dismissed as archaic. In this cultural tension between tradition 
and progress, new practices and ideas are created, and in short order they are assumed to 
be ageless and long-standing—they are perceived as traditional even when they represent 
recent developments. Vesting new practices with the status of “tradition” lends them a kind 
of authenticity and moral authority that is difficult to contest; part of their value is in their 
assumed existence over long periods of time. Indeed, it has been discovered that a number 
of current traditions conceived to be age-old were in fact invented in relatively recent times, 
often within the past century or two, while being presented as rooted in antiquity.55 The 
tradition of family surname usage is a prime example of a modern development instituted 
for specific reasons which was then promulgated as ancient and irrefutable. In this way, 
cultural practices can operate in such a way as to erase the collective consciousness of 
anything contrary to their dictates. 
Some scholars conceive of legal systems as antithetical to tradition—or at least, to 
traditional societies—and a system of law is conceived as one in which “traditions have 
largely been broken down.”56 Yet, the relationship between tradition and law is not so 
clear cut, as they are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they operate interchangeably in a 
nuanced manner. Both culture and law exert pressure on each other. Cultural changes often 
precede legal ones, but the legal system also imposes mandates that subsequently shift the 
social order. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,57 for example, is perhaps one of the 
most prominent examples of this phenomenon; the new legal prohibition against racially 
segregated schools brought about sweeping social change across the country. Each system 
includes enforcement mechanisms, and while enforcement of tradition is certainly less 
formal than that of law, it can be just as powerful in its effect on behavior. At times, the law 
is employed to enforce a tradition beginning to erode.
Despite the common law standard of flexibility and personal choice in surname usage, 
the practice of a wife surrendering her name for her husband’s was as close to a legal 
requirement during the modern period as it could be without having any actual legal support 
as such. The practice became so entrenched, in fact, with such significant implications 
54  Id. at 8.
55  See the invention of tradition (Eric Hobsbawm & Terrence Ranger eds., 1983).
56  See Craig T. Palmer & Kathryn Coe, From Morality to Law: The Role of Kinship, Tradition and Politics, 
PolitiCs and Culture (Apr. 29, 2010), https://politicsandculture.org/2010/04/29/from-morality-to-law-the-
role-of-kinship-tradition-and-politics/ [https://perma.cc/Z2P6-PLAC].
57  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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attached thereto, that when American women began to assert their common law right to 
choose their name in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the legal response 
was swift and negative.58 In the absence of legal precedent, government and courts stepped 
in to create it out of whole cloth. The circumstances under which such cases arose were 
various. Although women could not be definitively forced to adopt the surname of their 
husbands in common usage, they could be—and were—punished for their refusal to do so 
in legal documents, with the sanction of state and federal governments and courts all the 
way into the 1970s. In a multitude of contexts, courts refused to recognize the individual 
identities of married women who had retained their birth names, instead holding that their 
proper and correct identification in the eyes of the law was as the wife of a given man. 
The implications of such rulings are more profound than the simple question of a person’s 
chosen moniker; a woman’s entire legal existence was contingent and relational. Allowing 
her an independent name might also suggest an independent identity, and courts were loath 
to permit that. In 1881, in a case apparently the first of its kind in the United States, a New 
York state court held in Chapman v. Phoenix National Bank that 
by the common law among all English speaking people, a woman, upon 
her marriage, takes her husband’s surname. That becomes her legal name, 
and she ceases to be known by her maiden name. By that name she must 
sue and be sued . . . and execute all legal documents. Her maiden surname 
is absolutely lost, and she ceases to be known thereby.59 
As such, service of process on her in her birth name was legally invalid. Remarkably, 
no citations or evidence were provided for the legal principles asserted—a move that 
is not only highly unusual, but also anathema in court decisions. Despite the dearth of 
support, this decision later proved momentous, as it was cited in multiple cases as an 
accurate and precedential statement of the United States law. Several legal treatises relied 
on Chapman in their statement of the common law denying women’s name autonomy, 
including American Jurisprudence60 and American Law Reports,61 which were themselves 
subsequently referenced for support by other cases addressing the issue. Suddenly what 
was never a common law principle henceforth became “well settled” and “immemorial.” 
58  See, e.g., Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 683–84 (Tenn. 1975) (discussing cases enforcing the wife’s 
mandatory assumption of the husband’s name); Kruzel v. Podell, 226 N.W.2d 458, 461–62 (Wis. 1975).
59  Chapman v. Phoenix Nat’l. Bank, 85 N.Y. 437, 449 (1881) (holding that service of process against the 
defendant was improper as the person named did not legally exist).
60  Id. at 460.
61  35 A.L.R. 417 (1925).
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The new invention was reinforced and perpetuated for a period of about a century. 
Many other courts followed suit in the next few decades. In 1923, a Massachusetts 
court dismissed a woman’s personal injury lawsuit because the vehicle in which she was 
injured was registered in her birth name, rather than her married name: “[W]hen she 
applied for registration of the automobile in 1923 she did so in a name that was not hers . 
. . .”62 The court went so far as to deem the car illegally registered and a “nuisance” on the 
road.63 In 1890, as in Chapman, a Texas court invalidated service of process on a married 
woman who had retained her birth name. The court found that service had been rendered 
on the wrong legal person.64 The person she was born as no longer legally existed, and 
the law would only recognize her legal existence in the name of her husband. In 1945, an 
Illinois appeals court sanctioned the denial of a woman’s right to vote when she failed to 
re-register in her husband’s name after her marriage.65 That court emphasized throughout 
the opinion the “immemorial custom” and “long and well-settled common law” requiring 
such a result: by “long-established custom, policy and rule of the common law among 
English-speaking peoples . . . a woman’s name is changed by marriage and her husband’s 
surname becomes as a matter of law her surname.”66 The court cited the 1881 Chapman 
case in support of these principles, which had itself asserted them without any support.67 In 
effect, that court decided that the state’s purported “interest” in requiring a woman to adopt 
the name of her husband outweighed the woman’s right not only to autonomy in choosing 
her name, but also her constitutional right to vote. In doing so, like the Chapman court, the 
state of Illinois transformed what had been merely a customary practice, mischaracterized 
as “immemorial,” into a legally mandated one. Multiple states followed along in refusing 
to register married women to vote in their birth names, and then defending those actions in 
court—even pressing the issue on appeal—rather than changing the practice.68 
62  Bacon v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 152 N.E. 35, 36 (Mass. 1926) (emphasis added).
63  Id.
64  Freeman v. Hawkins, 14 S.W. 364, 365 (Tex. 1890); see also Harper v. Hudgings, 211 S.W. 63 (Mo. 
1919); Morris v. Tracy, 48 Pac. 571 (Kan. 1897); Rudolph v. Hively, 188 S.W. 721 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
65  Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945).
66  Id. at 644–45 (emphasis added).
67  Id.
68  See, e.g., Custer v. Bonadies, 318 A.2d 639 (Conn. Supp. 1974) (rejecting the state’s argument that 
married women assume their husbands’ surname as a matter of law and must therefore register to vote in 
that name); State v. Taylor, 415 So.2d 1043 (Ala. 1982) (upholding trial court decision that the state may not 
prohibit women from registering to vote in their birth names rather than their husband’s names); Stuart v. Board 
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As the twentieth century progressed, the surname cases became more frequent, and 
the courts were unyielding in their suppression of women’s legal identity. The Alabama 
Supreme Court took the earlier jurisprudence a step further, deciding that the “more perfect 
and complete” identification of a married woman was one which used her husband’s first 
name as well as his surname, with the prefix “Mrs.” applied, therefore making ‘Hattie W. 
Jones’ one ‘Mrs. J.C. Jones’.69 The case represents a clear departure from earlier cases that 
had held that the legally correct name of a married woman consisted of her given Christian 
name and her husband’s surname.70 This new double-erasure of identity does not appear 
to have taken a foothold in the legal development of the issue, but it suggests a perceived 
need to further buttress and tighten an area of law that was becoming subject to increasing 
scrutiny amidst challenges to the gendered hierarchy embedded in the status quo. Decades 
later, the legal landscape remained rigid; one woman was suspended from her job with 
a county health department in 1974 for refusing to adopt her husband’s surname after 
marriage, violating the county’s mandatory “name change policy.”71 In 1976, a federal 
court in Kentucky asserted that the state’s common law required a woman to abandon 
her birth name and assume her husband’s name at marriage.72 Trial courts in Nebraska 
and Arizona as late as 1980 refused to grant divorces because the wife was listed in the 
court paperwork in her birth name rather than her married name.73 A Florida court denied 
a woman the right to resume her birth name even after a divorce, surmising that it might 
embarrass her children.74 The court thereby not only suggested that a mother’s surname 
independence was inherently shameful to those connected to her, but also held that even 
unsubstantiated speculation as to the possible embarrassment that independence might 
of Sup’rs of Elections for Howard County, 295 A.2d 223 (Md. 1972).
69  Roberts v. Grayson, 173 So. 38, 39 (Ala. 1937).
70  See, e.g., Uihlein v. Gladieux, 78 N.E. 363 (Ohio 1906); Brown v. Reinke, 199 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1924).
71  Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 523 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding plaintiff’s Title VII sex discrimination 
claim).
72  Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582, 583 (6th Cir. 1976). The appellate court declined to rule on the 
question of whether the trial court’s assertion of Kentucky common law was accurate, but nevertheless upheld 
the decision denying the plaintiff the right to retain her birth name on her driver’s license.
73  Simmons v. O’Brien, 272 N.W.2d 273 (Neb. 1978) (overturning trial court’s refusal to grant divorce and 
holding that a married woman may legally bear a surname different from her husband); Malone v. Sullivan, 605 
P.2d 447 (Ariz. 1980) (holding that no common law, statute, or rule requires a woman to assume her husband’s 
name, and the court commissioner therefore abused his discretion in refusing to consider wife’s divorce petition 
that was filed in her maiden name).
74  Pilch v. Pilch, 447 So.2d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (overturning trial court’s refusal to allow the 
wife’s name change).
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cause her offspring was of more legal import than the woman’s rights to autonomy in her 
own name and identity. 
For over a century, states in many cases asserted their own legal interest in the gendered 
tradition of marital surnames separate and apart from any interests or desires of either 
party to the marriage itself. In South Carolina, a court held that “an application to change 
the name of a wife without the concurrence and consent of the husband is . . . wrong in 
principle.”75 The court noted that should the husband successfully petition to change his 
surname, the wife’s name would automatically change along with it, regardless of her 
own consent.76 The court’s interest, then, was not so much in marital harmony and mutual 
consent as it was in the husband’s authority over the marital unit, even after separation. 
This was perceived by the court as most conducive to a potential reconciliation between 
the estranged couple,77 in which the states have an asserted interest. Indeed, even when the 
husband agreed to the wife’s name change, courts were still prone to deny such requests: 
one Texas court in 1977 seems to have approached this issue as concerning the collective 
rights of men, rather than of a particular man, when it refused to allow a woman’s name 
change even when the husband had consented. The judge stated that allowing such a thing 
“would be detrimental to the institution of the home and family life and contrary to the 
common law and customs of this state.”78 In a similar 1974 Indiana case, a woman took her 
husband’s name at marriage but later tried to change it back, with her husband’s consent. In 
refusing to grant the petition, the trial court unilaterally decided there was no harm to her 
“sense of dignity and existence as an individual” or her identity by being forced to use her 
husband’s name, contrary to the wife’s own assertions.79 Even more remarkable, however, 
was the state’s emotional and vitriolic characterization of the wife in its argument that her 
name change request should be denied: 
Perhaps she is claiming the woman’s privilege that in an argument she does 
not have to use reason . . . . It can be reasonably inferred that she believes 
that fact that she is the breadwinner of the family should be publicized so 
75  Converse v. Converse, 30 S.C. Eq. 535, 539–40 (S.C. App. Eq. 1856).
76  Id. at 539.
77  Id. at 540.
78  In re Erickson, 547 S.W.2d 357, 358–60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (reversing trial court’s denial of wife’s 
name change request).
79  Petition of Hauptly, 312 N.E.2d 857, 859 (Ind. 1974) (overturning trial court denial of married woman’s 
petition to legally resume her maiden name).
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that all will know her husband has been emasculated and that she is the 
head of the family . . . indicating that perhaps Mrs. Hauptly’s need was not 
for a change of name but for a competent psychiatrist . . . . Namely, a sick 
and confused woman, unhappy and unsatisfied with her marriage, unable 
to determine what she wants to do with her life . . . because she was kind 
of odd ball . . . .80 
Such a response is telling in its unconventionality. The state’s desire to maintain the 
hegemonic naming structure was almost personal in its intensity, going well beyond 
reasoned legal argument and application of legal precedent in its suggestion that no sane, 
secure woman would ever make such a request.81 
The invented common law principle was used in several attempts to deny women the 
right to run for office as well. In Ohio, a taxpayer sued to prevent a married woman from 
being placed as a candidate on a judicial ballot in her birth name. The petitioner argued that 
the candidate’s name had automatically changed to her husband’s name at marriage, and 
because she had failed to officially change her name “back” to her birth name, her candidacy 
under her birth name was invalid.82 Even as late as 2008, a challenge was levied when a 
married woman ran in a primary election using her birth name. The trial court struck her 
name from the ballot, calling it “misconduct” for her to have not used her married name, 
despite no such requirement existing in state law.83 Though the decision was overturned on 
appeal, the principles involved are clearly still present in the public consciousness and are 
resistant to change, even to the point of garnering legal approval. 
The federal government likewise lent its own formal authority to enforcement of the 
“tradition” into the 1970s. The United States Department of State concluded that any 
married woman’s name was legally that of her husband, and routinely refused to issue 
passports to married women who applied using their birth names.84 A married woman 
applying for citizenship in her birth name was denied the right to retain her birth name on 
80  Id. at 861 (Hunter, J., concurring).
81  The state supreme court appears troubled by the state’s personal attacks on the wife (the concurring Justice 
even more so), ultimately deciding that the justification provided for the state’s position was unreasonable and 
without merit. Id. at 860.
82  State ex rel. Krupa v. Green, 177 N.E.2d 616, 618 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
83  Levey v. Dijols, 990 So.2d 688, 691–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
84  una stannard, mrs. man 256 (1973) (discussing passports).
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her naturalization documents; despite the fact that she was a professional musician well-
known by that name, the court contended that forcing her to adopt her husband’s name 
legally would result in no harm to her (or to any other professional women of “note and 
standing,” according to the judge). Citing Chapman and opining that it represents “sound 
policy,” the court held that upon her marriage she automatically abandoned her name 
in favor of his, regardless of her wishes.85 In misstating the common law, the Chapman 
court had effectively invented new common law that was used as authority in future cases. 
The justifications for these decisions were typically meager, referring to vague notions 
of tradition and “long-established custom” and “rule of the common law . . . whereby a 
woman’s name is changed by marriage and her husband’s surname becomes as a matter of 
law her surname.”86 
Even the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in 1972 in Forbush 
v. Wallace.87 An Alabama woman brought a class action lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of an unwritten Alabama regulation that a wife’s surname was by law 
that of her husband and that the driver’s license of a married woman must be issued in 
her husband’s last name as the only proper legal name of the wife.88 A three-judge federal 
district court upheld the regulation in a per curium decision, citing the “confusion” and 
inconvenience that would result if drivers were allowed to obtain licenses in whatever 
name they wished, which outweighed the interests of all women to autonomy in their 
names.89 As with other cases not involving a dispute between spouses, the court concluded 
that the state itself had a legitimate interest in requiring a woman to adopt her husband’s 
surname at marriage. The court asserted without explanation that “uniformity among the 
several states in this area is important.”90 It was likely not uniformity for its own sake 
that the court found so imperative, but uniformity in maintaining the subordinate status 
of married women: the court justified the upholding of the marital name requirement with 
the astonishing assertion that a woman’s adoption of her husband’s name “is a tradition 
85  In re Kayaloff, 9 F. Supp. 176, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
86  Rago v. Lipsky, 63 N.E.2d 642, 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1945); see also Elberson v. Richards, 42 N.J.L. 69 
(1880); Blanc v. Blanc, 47 N.Y. Supp. 694 (Sup. Ct. 1897); Rich v. Mayer, 7 N.Y. Supp. 69 (City Ct. 1889); 
Harper v. Hudgings, 211 S.W. 63 (Mo. 1919); Lane v. Duchac, 41 N.W. 962 (Wis. 1889).
87  Forbush v. Wallace, 405 U.S. 970 (1972).
88  Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 219 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
89  Id. at 221–222.
90  Id. at 222.
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extending back into the heritage of most western civilizations.”91 This entirely fictitious 
(and uncited) claim says much more than that we are dealing with a custom that we value 
because it has been around for a while; it proclaims that the practice is fundamental to 
our very existence as a civilization. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision without a 
written opinion.92 In 1976, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Forbush in a case 
upholding a similar unwritten regulation in Kentucky, despite there being some question 
from the appellate court as to the accuracy of the trial judge’s contention that the common 
law of Kentucky required a married woman to assume her husband’s name.93 
The “tradition” held such power that when faced with resistance, the law was invoked 
to enforce it, elevating the tradition to a kind of quasi-law in effect, and for a period, 
actual law. Yet, the courts in doing so either failed to cite any definitive legal standard or 
common law history in support of such claims, or they cited earlier cases that themselves 
had cited no standard and instead simply fabricated it, simply asserting the principles as 
if taking judicial notice of an incontrovertible fact that can scarcely be refuted. Unwilling 
to acknowledge that they were in fact constructing new common law, what support was 
provided by the courts simply referenced the “fundamental,” “primary,” “natural,” and 
“time-honored” rights of men to the naming of their family that were implicitly founded in 
the laws of nature.94
The late 1970s and early 1980s saw these holdings begin to crumble when the Chapman 
precedent was more carefully examined in appellate courts across the country. In another 
name change request, a Milwaukee school board had insisted that an employee either use 
her husband’s surname or legally change her name “back” to her birth name, even though 
she had never used anything other than her birth name either before or after her marriage,95 
thus requiring the woman to secure judicial permission to continue to eschew the tradition. 
In an effort to comply, the woman filed a petition to “change” her name to her birth name. 
But the trial court denied her request. Holding that a woman’s name automatically legally 
becomes that of her husband upon marriage under common law principles, the court also 
concluded that granting the request would not serve the interests of any potential future 
91  Id.
92  Forbush, 405 U.S. at 970.
93  Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582, 583 (6th Cir. 1976).
94  Rio v. Rio, 504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (App. Div. 1986); In re Trower, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (Ct. App. 1968).
95  Kruzel v. Podell, 226 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1975).
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children (she had none at the time of the petition).96 Thus the court not only misstated and 
thereby altered the common law, it also prioritized the speculative interests of nonexistent 
people over the legal requests of the woman when such requests were disruptive of the 
male-oriented status quo. It held that the woman, by virtue of her marriage alone, legally 
possessed a name that she neither wanted nor had ever used. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, however, eviscerated this argument on appeal, pointedly dismissing the trial court’s 
statement that the common law requires women to adopt the surname of the husband. 
The Court examined the 1881 Chapman, holding that “[i]t is well settled by common-law 
principles and immemorial custom that a woman upon marriage abandons her maiden 
name and assumes the husband’s surname.”97 The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded 
that this statement was nothing more than the personal opinion of the judge in the case 
rather than a reflection of established law, noting that no authority of any kind was cited for 
that statement and holding that it was “plainly error.”98 
It was becoming increasingly clear that “tradition” was wholly inadequate to serve as 
the sole foundation for an official legal principle that was otherwise directly at odds with 
emerging constitutional notions of gender equality, and courts were looking with more 
skepticism at the common law assertions of Chapman and its progeny. In 1975, a federal 
district court in Arkansas held that the state may not constitutionally require women to 
register to vote using their husband’s or ex-husband’s surname, nor could it require women 
to prefix their names with Miss or Mrs.99 That same year, the Tennessee Supreme Court held 
that the state could not require a woman to take her husband’s name for voter registration 
purposes.100 A Florida district court held in 1976 that married women could not be denied 
a driver’s license in their birth names or be required to take their husband’s surname at 
marriage.101 A federal appeals court in 1977 held that a woman who had been suspended 
from employment at a county health department for refusing to adopt her husband’s 
surname after marriage was entitled to back pay.102 The Arizona Supreme Court in 1980 
96  Id. at 460.
97  Id. (internal citation omitted).
98  Id. at 461.
99  Walker v. Jackson, 391 F.Supp. 1395 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
100 Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Tenn. 1975).
101 Davis v. Roos, 326 So.2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
102 Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522, 525 (6th Cir. 1977). Other cases ventured into the complex realm of the 
surnames of children. See, e.g., In re Schiffman, 620 P.2d 579, 583 (Cal. 1980) (rejecting the “common law and 
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held that the marital surname custom had never been law and noted that not even New 
York courts, where Chapman originated, considered the decision precedential.103 These 
cases typically rested on a reassessment of the common law, equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,104 and/or state statutory 
and constitutional law prohibiting sex discrimination. By the early 1980s it had become 
established that a married woman had the right to use any name she chose after marriage.
Yet, even though the law retreated from compulsive enforcement of the custom, that 
custom nevertheless forged on quite robustly. While exceptions are permitted,105 they are 
far from the norm, and the underlying principle remains strongly entrenched. There persists 
a strong social stigma against violating the “traditional” marital name change norms.106 
Research has found that women who maintain their birth names after marriage are viewed 
as less committed to the marriage,107 and men are less likely than women to view it as 
acceptable.108 A 2011 study found that nearly three quarters thought it was generally better 
if a woman takes her husband’s name; half thought it was a good idea for states to legally 
require it; and nearly half disagreed that it was “okay” for a man to take his wife’s name 
at marriage.109 It is notable that the abstract attitudes of women tend to be more egalitarian 
than their actual personal plans, suggesting that social pressure continues to play a role in 
decision-making in this area.110 It is estimated that between seventy-five and ninety-five 
custom, which have given the father a ‘primary right’ to have his child bear his surname . . . .”).
103 Malone v. Sullivan, 605 P.2d 447, 449 (Ariz. 1980).
104 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964).
105 Exceptions are permitted for women more than for men; in many states, men are still prohibited from 
adopting the surname of the wife at marriage. See Deborah Anthony, A Spouse by Any Other Name, 17 wm. & 
mary J. women & l. 187 (2010).
106 Rachel Stoiko & JoNell Strough, ‘Choosing’ the Patriarchal Norm: Emerging Adults’ Marital Last 
Name Change Attitudes, Plans, and Rationales, 34 Gend. issues 295, 297 (2017); Laurie Scheuble et al., 
Marital Name Changing Attitudes and Plans of College Students: Comparing Change over Time and Across 
Regions, 66 sex roles 282, 284 (2012); Claudia Goldin & Maria Shim, Making a Name: Women’s Surnames 
at Marriage and Beyond, 18 J. eCon. PersP. 143, 146 (2004).
107 Scheuble et al., supra note 106, at 285.
108 Id. at 284.
109 Hamilton et al., Marital Name Change and Gender Attitudes, 25 Gender & soC’y 145, 156–57 (2011).
110 Scheuble et al., supra note 106, at 284.
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percent of all women assume their husband’s name upon marriage,111 though the numbers 
appear to fluctuate over time and by region in inconsistent ways.112 A 1994 study determined 
that ninety percent or more of women took their husband’s name, and of the rest, only two 
percent used their birth name exclusively with no change or name combination.113 Recent 
research into public attitudes about marital names (as opposed to actual practices) yielded 
similarly conservative results: all existing studies investigating the future plans of college 
students found that a majority planned to conform to the traditional norm, with the range 
from 60% to 95%,114 with that number appearing to have increased over time.115 The New 
York Times reports, however, that an analysis conducted by The Upshot roughly estimated 
that around 20% of women in recent years have kept their birth names after marriage, 
which is more than at any other time in history, though their reasons were often more 
practical than political or ideological.116 The most common rationale provided by both 
women and men for preferring the wife to change her name was tradition;117 consistency 
across time and region “suggests powerful ideological underpinnings of the patriarchal 
name change norm in the United States for heterosexual marriages.”118 
Even less common than a wife retaining her birth name is a husband taking his wife’s 
name—that practice is exceptionally rare. There are no studies about the numbers of men 
taking the names of their wives at marriage—perhaps because the numbers are considered 
so small as to not merit mention, or perhaps because it does not occur to researchers to 
111 Goldin & Shim, supra note 106, at 144; David R. Johnson & Laurie Scheuble, Marital Name Change: 
Plans and Attitudes of College Students, 55 J. marriaGe & fam. 747 (1993); Jennifer Christman, The Name 
Game Despite Options, 90% of Women Choose to Take Husband’s Name, arK. demoCrat-Gazette, Mar. 
8, 2000, at F1; Hillary Drops Her Maiden Name, brisbane times (Apr. 30, 2007, 9:37 AM), https://www.
brisbanetimes.com.au/news/world/hillary-drops-her-maiden-name/2007/04/30/1177788007743.html [https://
perma.cc/9P3D-UPJQ]; Betsy Rubiner, Married Women and Surnames: Tradition Still Plays a Large Role, 
seattle times, Nov. 3, 1996, at L6.
112 Scheuble et al., supra note 106, at 283.
113 Id. at 282 (citing J. Brightman, Why Wives Use Their Husbands’ Names, 16 ameriCan demoCraPhiCs 
9–10 (1994)).
114 Stoiko, supra note 106, at 298.
115 Id.
116 Claire Cain Miller & Derek Willis, Maiden Names, on the Rise Again, n.y times (June 27, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/upshot/maiden-names-on-the-rise-again.html [https://perma.cc/3NAT-VJQR].
117 Stoiko, supra note 106, at 303, 309.
118 Id. at 308.
Columbia Journal of Gender and law 2137.1
investigate such a phenomenon. Marital naming choices are highly influenced by societal 
pressures and the continuing entrenchment and social importance of concepts of tradition. 
Furthermore, while a couple’s choices are legally broader than they once were, they are 
even today not egalitarian, and are often restricted by gender. While women are legally 
permitted to simply and easily change their names at marriage in every state but Louisiana, 
in many states men are prohibited from doing so via the same streamlined process. Men 
are instead required to file a legal action, pay court filing fees, and publish notice in the 
local paper, all at significantly increased time, hassle, and expense. A minority of states 
explicitly allow the same rights for men as for women in their marital names. Although on 
its face this appears to be discrimination against men, it is not: taking their husbands’ names 
at marriage was never a “right” of women, but rather a requirement. The right is really to 
have a spouse adopt one’s name at marriage, which continues to inhere in the husband.119 
Indeed, even the continued use of the term “maiden name” serves to reinforce the 
hierarchical naming structure. A “maiden” is, by definition, simply an unmarried woman, 
but the word is not used in that way in contexts other than with names. The continued use 
of the term—with no male equivalent—in both public discourse and on official documents 
leaves no room for women who keep their birth names after marriage or who change their 
names through a context other than marriage (because she would then have two different 
“maiden,” or pre-marriage, names). Nor does it allow for men to change their names at 
marriage or at any other time. This then gives official formal sanction only to the standard 
and customary naming structure and serves to reinforce its continuity. 
B. Tradition in the Naming of Children
After women won the right to their own surname autonomy, the underlying principles 
forged on in related cases. Where the logic of natural male rights to the naming of the 
wife has fallen away as constitutionally indefensible, it has pressed on in the context of 
the naming of children, with mixed results. These cases often continue to defer to the the 
man’s naming rights, if not over his wife any longer, then at least over his children. Courts 
have espoused the notion that a father has a “protectible [sic] interest in having his child 
bear his surname”120 and that it is “well known” that “a surname provides a means of 
identifying the child with the father’s family.”121 In 1976, a Washington county registrar 
refused to issue a standard birth certificate for a child born out of wedlock because the 
119 See Anthony, supra note 105.
120 Newman v. King, 433 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. 1968).
121 Bennett v. Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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child carried the mother’s surname, even with the consent of the father.122 As late as 2006, 
an Oregon trial court granted an unmarried father’s demand to have his child’s last name 
legally changed from the mother’s to his by virtue of his status as the father, implicitly 
granting the father’s request for a “paternal presumption” in the naming of his children. The 
decision was overturned on appeal, and the father’s request was ultimately denied, along 
with the “paternal presumption” the trial court had endorsed.123 In a 1985 case in Kansas, 
the parents divorced and the father subsequently died, and the mother had remarried. The 
mother’s petition to change the surname of the minor child was denied in part because the 
trial court determined that “[a] deceased father . . . is . . . entitled to have his child bear his 
name in accordance with the usual custom of succession to the paternal surname.”124 The 
appellate court agreed, noting the “longstanding tradition in this country that a child carry 
the surname of his father” and concluding that “there is a protectable parental, generally 
paternal, interest in seeing that a child’s name remains unchanged.”125 Yet, when it is 
the father who is requesting the change, that presumption that “a child’s name remains 
unchanged” appears to run the other direction: in a 2011 Kansas case, the parents were 
divorced at the time of the birth, the father was not listed on the birth certificate, and the 
child was given the mother’s surname. The father later petitioned to change the child’s 
surname to his. The trial court judge noted that “tradition says the child has the father’s last 
name,”126 and held that it would serve the child’s best interests to carry her father’s surname 
and ordered that it be changed.127 Under the current naming scheme, a woman’s heritage 
is minimized; there is little concern about her family name dying out by her marriage, nor 
recognition of the mother as part of the child’s legacy through her surname, whereas all of 
these are of central concern to courts on behalf of men. 
The commonly employed presumption of historical universality is clearly factually 
inaccurate. The notion of custom is subject to interpretation and thus is easily manipulated. 
However, such arguments also conflate tradition and ubiquity with law and justice. It is at 
122 Doe v. Dunning, 549 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1976).
123 Doherty v. Wizner, 150 P.3d 456, 463 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
124 Matter of Morehead, 10 Kan. App.2d 625, 626 (Ct. App. 1985).
125 Id. at 627.
126 In re Denning, 198 P.3d 212 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009).
127 Id. (affirming trial court’s decision to change the child’s surname to that of the father). But see Rio v. Rio, 
504 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (App. Div. 1986); Jenkins v. Austin, 255 S.W.3d 24, 27 (2008) (“Neither parent has the 
absolute right to confer his or her name upon the child.”); In re H.M.C., 876 N.E.2d 805, 808 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2007) (“A father and mother enjoy equal rights with regard to naming their child.”).
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best questionable whether tradition simply for its own sake should ever be a guiding force 
in law. Certainly the legal landscape would be quite different today if the maintenance of 
what is viewed to be tradition were generally held to be a legitimate state interest in its own 
right, particularly with respect to demographic groups that have been historically subjected 
to pervasive oppression and discrimination. 
IV. Politics and the Making of Cultural Memory
Surnames are more than simply superficial identifiers; they are psychologically, 
socially, and politically meaningful. They serve as statements of individuality, religion, 
family relations, culture, identity, and politics. At times they have been forcefully ascribed 
or prohibited to exert control and dominance.128 Use of the surname MacGregor was 
banned in Scotland in 1603 after conflicts between that clan and King James VI.129 Nazis 
in the 1930s mandated the addition of the name “Sarah” or “Israel” to the names of Jews 
to mark them as other.130 While the United States immigrants were commonly (and not 
always voluntarily) given new surnames at Ellis Island to more effectively integrate them 
into American culture, American slaves often had no surnames at all due to their status as 
property, or were given the surname of the master, with that name sometimes changing 
with each successive owner.131 As surnames became more closely tied to property, identity, 
and power, their political importance grew. Nowhere is this more evident than with the 
surnames of women. As law and practice surrounding women’s names became increasingly 
restrictive, the significance ascribed to them expanded, operating as both a contributor to 
and a reflection of women’s diminished social and political standing.
As part of this process, the history of women’s surnames was wholly erased from the 
collective consciousness. All of the customary surname practices were not just abandoned; 
they were wiped clean from social memory, with the new narrative asserting that the modern 
restrictions on women were in fact representative of the better part of a millennium of 
English tradition and law. The massive scale and success of such a sweeping falsehood—
128 See, e.g., supra note 53 (discussing examples of systematic surname coercion as a means of social 
control and dominance).
129 James finlayson, surnames and sirenames 23 (1863), http://archive.org/details/cu31924029805383 
[https://perma.cc/9NZ7-2P8R].
130 Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 u. 
Chi. l. rev. 761, 770 (2007).
131 Lisa Kelly, Divining the Deep and Inscrutable: Toward a Gender-Neutral, Child-Centered Approach to 
Child Name Change Proceedings, 99 w. va. l. rev. 1, 12–17 (1996).
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essentially uncontested even into the current day—merits additional examination. 
 History, as the vehicle by which we distinguish truth from untruth and come to 
understand the past, is not static or locked in as objective fact. Narratives of the past are 
mutable and shifting, creating political and social meaning for the present, and supporting 
or challenging dominant perspectives while imbuing them with value and structure.132 The 
altered narrative surrounding marital surnames is a prime example of this phenomenon. 
In his work On Collective Memory, Maurice Halbwachs construed memory not as 
an individual neurological occurrence, but rather as a collective cultural and social one. 
As a social construction, he argued, memory is provisional and subject to manipulation 
and revision, making it both a public and a private phenomenon.133 Other scholars have 
expanded upon these ideas, noting the ways in which social memory constructs the past 
not only to define it, but also to shape the present and future, both representing and forming 
social relations.134 Cultural memory is not passively received, but actively performed in 
the creation of shared cultural knowledge and identity.135 History and memory are thus 
intertwined and at times oppositional.136 The historical narrative is particularly important 
132 See Katharine Hodgkin & Susannah Radstone, Introduction, in Contested Pasts: the PolitiCs of 
memory 1 (Katharine Hodgkin & Susannah Radstone eds., 2003); Marita Sturken, tanGled memories: the 
vietnam war, the aids ePidemiC, and the PolitiCs of rememberinG 1 (1997).
133 mauriCe halbwaChs, on ColleCtive memory (1992); see also Mieke Bal, Introduction, in aCts of 
memory: Cultural reCall in the Present (Mieke Bal et al., eds., 1999).
134 James fentress & Chris wiCKham, soCial memory 25 (1992); Alon Confino, Collective Memory and 
Cultural History: Problems of Method, 102 am. hist. rev. 1386, 1390 (1997); see also Leo Spitzer, Back 
Through the Future: Nostalgic Memory and Critical Memory in a Refuge from Nazism, in aCts of memory: 
Cultural reCall in the Present, supra note 133 (discussing the central nature of the future in acts and aspects 
of memory); Bal, supra note 133, at vii; miChel fouCault, lanGuaGe, Counter-memory, PraCtiCe: seleCted 
essays and interviews (Donald F. Bouchard ed., 1977) (examining the constructed nature of cultural history, 
arguing that cultural traditions represent contrived conceptions that we have imposed upon history, rather 
than objectively true historical fact); Jonathan Crewe, Recalling Adamastor: Literature as Cultural Memory 
in “White” South Africa, in aCts of memory: Cultural reCall in the Present, supra note 133 (discussing 
the ways in which memory manipulation can function as “social forgetting rather than remembering” so as to 
fictionalize and idealize a history that did not take place).
135 Bal, supra note 133, at vii; see also Sturken, supra note 132, at 7; rainGard esser, PolitiCs of memory: 
the writinG of Partition in the seventeenth-Century low Countries 239–240 (2012) (discussing the “public 
memory created and perpetuated” by those writing on historical events of the Eighty Years’ War, which served 
to support cultural identities of the seventeenth century).
136 Sturken, supra note 132, at 5–6 (rejecting Pierre Nora’s assertion that history’s fundamental purpose is to 
“suppress and destroy” memory, instead arguing that history and memory are entangled).
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because tradition is a central component of the legitimacy of the present structures.137 
While inconvenient aspects of the past are expunged, new falsified memories can survive 
for many generations as they are passed on through the socialization process,138 thereby 
influencing individual as well as collective identity and impacting decisions made at every 
level, as the sense of self is implicated in these collective social conceptions.139 In this 
sense, history is made backwards. Existing power structures construct and define history 
and identity, self and other, citizen and non-citizen in the present, which then serve to 
inform ideas of the past. The past is then cyclically bound and marshaled in the service 
of current policy, molding and shaping cultural understanding, and the national memory 
becomes national property. In the case of surnames, the rivalry between history and memory 
becomes apparent as new cultural memory mandates suppressed the aspects of history that 
contradicted its principles.
Political power is paramount in mediating the tension between history and memory; 
collective memory is, at its core, political.140 The politics of memory reflect the appropriation, 
invention, and invocation of the past in ways that significantly impact power relations. A 
particular set of notions are advanced about culture, law, society, and the nation, sometimes 
serving subversive or malicious ends in the struggle over meaning,141 even to the point of 
collective self-deception.142 Aleida Assman argues that this process is actively undertaken 
by political leadership to support existing power structures by the creation of a particular 
image of the past.143 Thus, collective cultural memory is the result of a struggle over which 
137 aleida assman, Cultural memory and western Civilization: funCtions, media, arChives 13 (2011).
138 Id. at 395.
139 Id.
140 See Popular Memory Group, Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method, in maKinG histories: studies 
in history–writinG and PolitiCs 205 (Richard Johnson et al. eds., 1982).
141 See Hodgkin & Radstone, supra note 132, at 5, 12; see also herbert hirsCh, GenoCide and the PolitiCs 
of memory: studyinG death to Preserve life (1995) (examining Nazi Germany as a case study in how 
memories and their coinciding myths are manipulated by those in leadership to construct identity and belief, 
and legitimate malicious purposes).
142 See Roy Baumeister & Stephen Hastings, Distortions of Collective Memory: How Groups Flatter and 
Deceive Themselves, in ColleCtive memory of PolitiCal events: soCial PsyCholoGiCal PersPeCtives 277 
(James W. Pennebaker et al. eds., 1997).
143 assman, supra note 137, at 12–13; see also hirsCh, supra note 141 at 23–24 (arguing that memory is a 
sociopolitical phenomenon, the control of which is a manifestation of political power).
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version of events gains purchase based on current political needs.144 The past, constantly 
shifting to accommodate political needs and current public policy, becomes elusive.145 
The process of cultural memory creation in modern times is often heavily tied 
up in a sense of national identity and collective ownership of national memory.146 The 
manipulation of political memory was particularly pronounced in the early modern period. 
Nation-states were developing out of the consolidation of political and military power, 
and with that came an increased historical awareness.147 E. J. Hobsbawm suggests, for 
instance, that the drive for a strong nation-state in the nineteenth century led people to 
concoct the imagery of their new nationalistic notions into the past, far beyond where they 
are actually supported by historical evidence.148 He sees a shift from organic, local memory 
to hegemonic, nationalistic approaches to memory beginning around 1800,149 “when 
nationalism was at its heyday and traditions were being invented thick and fast.”150 What 
144 See herbert hirsCh, supra note 141, at 29; see also Sturken, supra note 132, at 6.
145 hirsCh, supra note 141, at 32.
146 Hodgkin & Radstone, supra note 132, at 26; see also Katharine Conley, The Myth of the “Dernier 
Poeme”: Robert Desnos and French Cultural Memory, in aCts of memory: Cultural reCall in the Present, 
supra note 133 (discussing the false cultural memory that served nationalistic purposes in the context of French 
heroism and resistance during the Nazi occupation); Alessandro Portelli, The Massacre at the Fosse Ardeatine: 
History, Myth, Ritual, and Symbol, in Contested Pasts: the PolitiCs of memory 33, 38 (Katharine Hodgkin 
& Susannah Radstone eds., 2003) (investigating incorrect versions of events that achieved hegemony in Rome 
regarding an incident that took place during the German occupation during World War II, suggesting that the 
reasons for the strength of the compromised collective memory related to the creation of the national identity 
which served the purposes of the Italian state).
147 Judith Pollmann & eriKa KuiJPers, Introduction: On The Early Modernity of Modern Memory, in 
memory before modernity: PraCtiCes of memory in early modern euroPe 2 (Erika Kuijpers et al. eds., 
2013).
148 e.J. hobsbawm, nations and nationalism sinCe 1780: ProGramme, myth, reality 76 (1992); see also 
Marouf Cabi, Clash of National Narratives and the Marginalization of Kurdish-Iranian History, 4 ContemP. 
rev. of the middle east 335 (2017) (investigating the marginalization of certain historical narratives and the 
transformation of myth into historical fact for nationalistic political purposes in Iranian and Kurdish national 
narratives); alexandr osiPian, The Usable Past in the Lemberg Armenian Community’s Struggle for Equal 
Rights, 1578–1654, in memory before modernity: PraCtiCes of memory in early modern euroPe 27 (Erika 
Kuijpers et al. eds., 2013) (noting in his study of the Armenian community of Lemberg that the early modern 
European culture saw the distant past as the decisive site of the creation of foundational rights and status).
149 Pollmann & Kuijpers, supra note 147, at 6.
150 Id. at 5.
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was older was viewed as more legitimate.151 History was thereby utilized as an ideological 
weapon in the battle for constructing nationalist identity.152 That new history entailed a 
long-standing suppression of women; not only were women denied many of the rights 
and benefits attendant to the advent of citizenship, but the collective memory was altered 
to justify and legitimize it. That national memory became central to any notion of what it 
meant to be English, and later, American. Eschewing it was not simply a matter of personal 
preference; it was an offense to the nation writ large. 
With the nation-state came new concepts of national identity, citizenship, and self 
versus other, with invented master narratives concocted to support them.153 This allowed 
individuals to conceive of themselves first and foremost as citizens in order to form a 
political community.154 Not coincidentally, this is the same period during which women’s 
rights had become most constricted and their surname options most confined. The privileges 
of citizenship were becoming clearly defined, but the process was taking place in the context 
of capitalism, colonialism and imperialism and their integral concepts of superiority and 
domination.155 Indeed, “almost all early modern claims to rights or authority were also 
claims about the past;”156 grounding citizenship rights in history and tradition would lend 
them a necessary legitimacy that was difficult to contravene. Citizenship rights were 
selectively granted, such that certain disfavored groups, including women, were formally 
excluded in ways previously not seen.157
In an environment where political and social authority derives so heavily from the 
151 Id. at 6.
152 Cabi, supra note 148, at 348.
153 Hodgkin & Radstone, supra note 132, at 15.
154 See Jonathan m. hess, Memory, History, and the Jewish Question: Universal Citizenship and the 
Colonization of Jewish Memory, in the worK of memory: new direCtions in the study of German soCiety 
and Culture 41 –42 (Alon Confino & Peter Fritzsche eds., 2002); see also Anne Heimo & Ulla-Maija Peltonen, 
Memories and Histories, Public and Private After the Finnish Civil War, in Contested Pasts: the PolitiCs 
of memory 42 (Katharine Hodgkin & Susannah Radstone eds., 2003) (stating that the national memory 
“produce[s] a common history to which all the community may relate”).
155 See Deborah Anthony, Analyzing the Disappearance of Women’s Surnames and the Retrenchment of 
their Political-Legal Status in Early Modern England, 29 hastinGs women’s l. J. 7, 9 (2018).
156 Pollmann & KuiJPers, supra note 147, at 6.
157 See id. for further discussion of the selective granting of citizenship rights.
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past, it is easy to see how and why the past “falls subject to constant reinvention,”158 often 
deliberately, so as to legitimize present power structures and the desired public discourse 
via a monolithic narrative of history. The implications are significant and far-reaching. 
Part of the power of the ability to reshape memory, and thereby alter the past, is that 
both the process and its effects are concealed and therefore largely shielded from public 
contestation. The “creators of a new future” are also “constructors of a new past.”159 Once 
the cultural narrative is altered and the past incorporated as part of the present, it can be 
difficult to disrupt, as new generations develop a strong identification with the historical 
regime.160 Revisionary memory can thus reign supreme for generations, particularly given 
the nationalistic identity’s “apocalyptic claim to truth.”161 Presented as objective fact, “the 
appeal to memory articulates the narrative of the nationalist past, and enjoins its subject to 
recognize and own it.”162 
A. Surnames and Political Memory
Scarcely are these processes more clearly evident than in the case of English women’s 
history. In the Early Modern period (approximately 1500–1800 A.D.), those holding 
political and legal power reconceived women’s historical narrative. A rich and varied 
history of women’s autonomy and individuality in their names, their family relationships, 
and their participation in public life was expunged in order to legitimize the “traditional” 
and natural status of what was actually a rather new structure of female inferiority and legal 
impotence.
An examination of the word “surname” itself is enlightening. The definition of the 
word shifted as its practical usage was reshaped. It was originally used to primarily mean 
“[a]n additional name, usually derived from a quality, an achievement, or a place and 
attached to one’s given name; . . . also, an epithet; a suffixed name-element,” with an 
158 Id. at 8.
159 Ulrich Niggemann,‘You Will See Who They Are That Revile, and Lessen Your . . . Glorious Deliverance’. 
The ‘Memory War’ about the ‘Glorious Revolution,’ in memory before modernity: PraCtiCes of memory in 
early modern euroPe 63 (Erika Kuijpers et al. eds., 2013) (quoting Melinda Zook) (discussing the “memory 
war” of the Glorious Revolution).
160 See Hodgkin & Radstone, supra note 132, at 12.
161 Hodgkin & Radstone, supra note 154, at 169 (quoting Abbas Vali).
162 Id.
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alternate definition being “a last name, surname; a family name, cognomen.”163 By the 
eighteenth century, however, “surname” had come to be known primarily as a family 
name,164 implying its hereditary and patrilineal nature. 
Even more striking is the dynamic surrounding the etymology of the word itself. 
“Surname” originates from the Old French surnom, from sur “upon” or “over,” and nom 
“name.” The word was Anglicized as “surname,” and used in English beginning around 
the fourteenth century.165 Remarkably, however, official authoritative and academic 
publications from the nineteenth and early twentieth century assert that the word “surname” 
actually originates from “sir” name (a man of rank or position),166 or “sire” name (father).167 
The word morphed into “sirname” in the late seventeenth century.168 Bailey’s 1736 
dictionary contains the word “sirname” 19 different times, and other dictionaries defined 
163 Surname, middle enGlish diCtionary (2014), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/m/mec/med–
idx?size=First+100&type=headword&q1=surname&rgxp=constrained [https://perma.cc/NQC6-EL6W]. 
University of Michigan’s online Middle English Dictionary defines words used in Middle English (1100-
1500) as they were used during that period.
164 Stormonth defined “surname” as “a name added to, or over and above, the baptismal or Christian name 
. . . the family name.” James stormonth, diCtionary of the enGlish lanGuaGe, inCludinG a very CoPious 
seleCtion of sCientifiC terms for use in sChools and ColleGes and as a booK of General referenCe 632 
(Edinburgh, W. Blackwood, 6th ed. 1881), https://archive.org/details/etymologicalpron00storrich [https://
perma.cc/QG3Y-QV59]. Webster in 1828 defined “surname” as “[a]n additional name; a name or appellation 
added to the baptismal or Christian name, and which becomes a family name . . . originally designated 
occupation, estate, place of residence, or some particular thing or event that related to the person.” noah 
webster, an ameriCan diCtionary of the enGlish lanGuaGe 710 (New York, S. Converse, Vol. 2. 1828), 
https://archive.org/details/americandictiona02websrich [https://perma.cc/4E84-F8BA].
165 Surname, the random house diCtionary of the enGlish lanGuaGe (2d ed. 1987).
166 Sir, merriam webster’s ColleGiate diCtionary (10th ed. 1994).
167 Sire, merriam webster’s ColleGiate diCtionary (10th ed. 1994).
168 See, e.g., Samuel Clarke, the lives & deaths of most of those eminent Persons who by their virtue 
and valour obtained the sirnames of maGni, or the Great whereof divers of them Give muCh liGht to 
the understandinG of the ProPheCies in esay, Jeremiah, ezeKiel, and daniel, ConCerninG the three first 
monarChies: and to other sCriPtures ConCerninG the CaPtivity, and restauration of the Jews (2d ed. 
1675), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A33329.0001.001?view=toc [https://perma.cc/UEN3-GL4L]; J. 
H. Lawrence-Archer, an aCCount of the sirname edGar: and PartiCularly of the family of wedderlie in 
berwiCKshire (1873); memorial for those of the sirname of fraser (1729); a bill to enable John freston, 
esq; and the heirs of his body, to taKe and use the sirname and arms of sCrivener (1754); A brief aCCount 
of s. uPon a. with . . . a desCriPtion . . . of the ColleGiate ChurCh, the mausoleum of shaKsPeare . . . 
to whiCh is added, some aCCount of the lives of three . . . Prelates who derive their sirnames from 
stratford, etC. (1800).
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the word “sirname” as an alternate version of “surname.”169 James Finlayson’s 1863 book 
expounding upon the history of surnames is entitled Surnames and Sirenames, in which 
he at times seems to equate the two words or use them interchangeably.170 Bowman’s 1932 
The History of Surnames claims that surnames “were generally called sirnames.”171 All 
references to “sirname” as an appropriate alternative to “surname” are factually incorrect; 
the meaning of the word had nothing at all to do with noblemen, fathers, or patriarchy. When 
the usage of surnames was altered, the history of the word itself was retroactively invented 
to be consistent with that new usage and thereby to reinforce it. This was made all the 
easier by the identical pronunciation of the two distinct prefixes. These written documents 
then served to distort and reshape the collective memory of surname operation and the 
“tradition” attendant thereto. The word was cleanly appropriated to refer exclusively to 
patriarchal naming systems, coming to mean “sire” name quite literally, as it was owned by 
the male alone and conferred upon other members of the family by the father exclusively. 
With what was purported to be centuries of history to back up the “tradition,” it became 
exceptionally difficult to disrupt. 
The concept of the “nation” and its unifying history going back into antiquity can be 
seen in William Blackstone’s expansive eighteenth century legal treatise on the English 
common law. In discussing coverture and women’s legal non-personhood, Blackstone noted 
that the “legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage”172 and she falls 
under the dominion of the husband and is stripped of all rights that require legal autonomy, 
with the husband even possessing the right to “correct” and “chastise[]” her as he would 
his servants or children.173 The work is imbued with the sense that the principles he was 
laying down to paper were founded on a law, custom, and culture that were fully ancient in 
nature, representing traditional English practice, and thereby implying their legitimacy.174 
He referred to the English common law as “handed down by tradition, use and experience”; 
stating that the “unwritten law . . . includes not only general customs . . . but also the 
particular customs of certain parts of the kingdom . . . . It is true indeed that . . . all laws 
169 Sirname, supra note 164, at 600.
170 Finlayson, supra note 129 at iv, 5, 8, 15, 22, 24.
171 bowman, supra note 10, at 9 (emphasis in original).
172 william blaCKstone, Commentaries on the laws of enGland 430 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, Vol. 1 
1765).
173 Id. at 432.
174 Id. at 442. Blackstone does allow that the English common law was likely influenced and shaped by 
various cultures.
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were intirely traditional . . . .” He claimed to use for his exposition customs going back 
to the Saxons, as well as judicial records and “treatises of learned sages,” stating that this 
traditional common law “receive[s its] binding power . . . by long and immemorial usage 
. . . , universal tradition and long practice.”175 Blackstone even seemed to minimize the 
influence of the Norman invasion on English common law, using as evidence the fact that the 
civil law system never took hold there despite its spread throughout the continent, thereby 
implying also that the principles expounded upon in his treatise are founded primarily on 
ancient (pure) English custom without significant Norman influence.176 His conclusion that 
the principle that women’s legal existence was “incorporated and consolidated into that of 
the husband” was thus also implicitly a fundamental part of long-standing ageless English 
tradition, ignoring all evidence to the contrary that dated back even to Saxon times, when 
the rights of women were remarkably expansive.177 He contended as part of this framework 
that the law of coverture serves, “for the most part” to benefit and protect women, asserting 
without irony that “[s]o great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of England.”178 
Earlier English jurist Henry de Bracton, commonly referred to as Bracton, similarly 
stated that husbands and wives at marriage become “a single person, because they are one 
flesh and blood,” wherein the husband “rules his wife.”179 Neither Blackstone nor Bracton 
discussed marital surnames, yet the principles they set down were commonly referenced 
to justify the legal treatment of women in the Early Modern period and the new marital 
surnames requirements imposed upon them. But Bracton and Blackstone were themselves 
likely engaged in an enterprise of more than simply recording extant English law. They were 
also themselves involved in the political process of English historical memory construction. 
As such, they were able to dictate the legal principles that most strongly coincided with 
their desired status quo, pointing to the evidence they identified that supported their 
positions, while dismissing whatever contrary empirical evidence and common practice 
existed. In that sense, they created English history while they also recorded it. Individual 
judges operated in a similar vein when they concluded, apparently basing largely on their 
own personal opinions and preferences, that the marital name requirements they laid down 
175 Id. at 17, 63, 64, 45.
176 Id. at 17–22.
177 Evidence suggests that Saxon women possessed significant rights and status in public life, legal position, 
property holdings, and social custom. See Anthony, supra note 38, at 220–23.
178 blaCKstone, supra note 172, at 433.
179 4 braCton on the laws and Customs of enGland 335 (c. 1220–1250), http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/
index.html [https://perma.cc/3V45-6AP2].
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were in actuality principles originating from time out of mind, ignoring not only factual 
examples to the contrary, but centuries of common law contradicting those requirements. 
Indeed, when application of the common law allowing personal choice of names found 
itself at loggerheads with the dominant social structure of women’s inferiority in marriage, 
the common law was forcibly manipulated and transmuted to satisfy the preferred status 
quo. 
In fact, so entrenched was the cultural memory of marital names, and so invested was 
the public in the perceived patriarchal nature of the tradition, that when English writers 
first began to point out the existence of female-derived and matrilineal names in English 
history, a backlash of anger ensued. The proposition was rejected and considered a patently 
offensive suggestion of the moral degradation of English culture.180 Charles Bardsley had 
noted the prevalence of historical matronymic English names in his 1873 Our English 
Surnames, their Sources and Significations.181 He received such a scathing response to 
the suggestion in a review by The Guardian that he spent some time in the preface to the 
second edition defending the point, identifying multiple historical examples as evidence.182 
Subsequent writers conceded that Bardsley was correct, but they went to some lengths to 
explain away the obvious frequency of matronymics in a way that did not seriously disrupt 
the cultural memory of gendered naming. The first assumption was that the only possible 
explanation for such an event was the birth of illegitimate children, since all children 
would otherwise (naturally) carry the name of the father.183 But surely there could not have 
been quite that much illegitimacy in English history. So other possible explanations were 
advanced: the adoption of children by unmarried women, the death of the father, and the need 
to distinguish townspeople carrying the same names might explain it.184 Perhaps even, in 
some cases, a particularly strong-willed mother was married to a particularly weak father.185 
All such explanations were created from the fully embedded and largely invisible vantage 
point of the modern status quo, which was supposed to represent incontrovertible (and 
inherently good and right) ancient custom—the default, ordinary, and natural occurrence 
would still have been a patronymic naming system. Even without any specific evidence 
180 bowman, supra note 10, at 94.
181 Charles wareinG endell bardsley, our enGlish surnames: their sourCes and siGnifiCations (1873).
182 See Charles wareinG endell bardsley, enGlish surnames: their sourCes and siGnifiCations xiii–xv 
(9th ed. 1915).
183 bowman, supra note 10, at 94.
184 See id. at 95; reaney & wilson, supra note 15, at 78.
185 bowman, supra note 10, at 95; reaney & wilson, supra note 15, at 78.
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supporting such explanations—indeed, the evidence points the other direction, since many 
examples of matronymics involved married mothers with surnames different from their 
living husbands who passed their own names on to their children186—it was presumed that 
any exceptions must have been based on unusual circumstances in the particular case. It 
could not have been that the entire naming framework operated differently than had been 
portrayed. If the tradition were truly as fundamental as was supposed, however, then even 
many of the purported reasons for matronymics would not suffice; a strong-willed mother, 
the death of the father, or multiple individuals bearing the same name would surely not be 
sufficient to overturn a practice as essential as patronymics. They are generally not enough 
to overturn it even today. The more accurate conclusion—that surname practices were 
once much more representative of women—was unthinkable. The erasure of the nuanced 
history of women from the cultural memory, and the political mechanisms served by it, was 
extraordinarily successful.
As Alon Confino notes, not only the representation of memory in the historical 
documents, but also the interpretation of and response to it by the public, are critical 
considerations.187 Although a thorough examination of the ways in which the public 
engaged with new dictates about the status of women is beyond the scope of this Article, 
there is evidence suggesting that even when formal legal documents and treatises in English 
history asserted the legal incapacity of women, women’s lived reality appears to have been 
quite divergent from the principles expressed therein. Despite doctrine expounding upon 
the common law, many of the older traditions continued for centuries, with considerable 
resistance to the new restrictions exhibited in women’s actual lived experience. Scholars 
have remarked upon the surprisingly prominent social status of medieval women.188 Marc 
Meyer observed with respect to women, “legal theory and practice are often diametrically 
opposed;”189 custom often controlled practice over formal legal doctrine.190 Indeed, as 
Heineman notes, gender “exists at the intersection of the individual and the collective,” thus 
“den[ying] the possibility of studying the political, the social, or the cultural in isolation.”191 
186 See Anthony, supra note 38.
187 Confino, supra note 134, at 1392.
188 See, e.g., Kathleen Casey, Women in Norman and Plantagenet England, in the women of enGland from 
anGlo-saxon times to the Present 89 (Barbara Kanner ed., 1979).
189 Marc Meyer, Land Charters and the Legal Position of Anglo-Saxon Women, in the women of enGland 
from anGlo-saxon times to the Present 70 (Barbara Kanner ed., 1979).
190 See Anthony, supra note 38, at 230–31 for further discussion of the tension between legal dictates and 
practical life.
191 Elizabeth Heineman, Gender, Public Policy, and Memory: Waiting Wives and War Widows in the Postwar 
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Gender is inextricable from other aspects of social organization, and must be considered 
in a broad context. Thus, contemporary statements of the legal history of women are not 
immune to the effects of cultural memory. Instead, they have served as incontrovertible 
evidence of women’s inferior status, thereby justifying, reinforcing, and perpetuating it. 
Social change brought about by manipulated social memory requires individual buy-
in to be effective.192 In the case of marital and family naming, this was achieved in the 
modern period, and is to this day clearly evidenced by personal opinion and choice on 
the matter.193 When formal law was for the most part no longer able to enforce compliance 
with the hegemonic custom, then collective emphasis on the importance of tradition was 
intensified (and very effectively so). After the battles of the 1970s wherein women achieved 
autonomy in their names, there appears to have been a cultural backlash. Fewer women 
were deciding to keep their names after marriage, in an apparent attempt to respect the 
tradition and eschew the political, “feminist” implications of keeping their names. The 
fact that as late as 2011 about three quarters of respondents thought it was better for a 
wife to take her husband’s name than any alternative, and all studies found the majority 
of college students—and sometimes an overwhelming majority—planning to conform to 
the “traditional” norm, provides strong evidence of the power of the cultural emphasis on 
the value of tradition and the nobility inherent in individual cultural vanguards resisting its 
erosion. 
CONCLUSION
In the words of the United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions 
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges 
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do . . . in 
determining the rules by which men should be governed.194 
Germanys, in the worK of memory: new direCtions in the study of German soCiety and Culture 215 (Alon 
Confino & Peter Fritzsche eds., 2002).
192 Katharine Hodgkin & Susannah Radstone, Transforming Memory: Introduction, in Contested Pasts: 
the PolitiCs of memory 25 (Katharine Hodgkin & Susannah Radstone eds., 2003).
193 See, e.g., Stoiko & Strough, supra note 106; Scheuble et al. supra note 106; Goldin & Shim, supra note 
106.
194 oliver wendell holmes, Jr., the Common law 1 (2013), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2449/2449-
Columbia Journal of Gender and law 3537.1
Holmes stated in legal terms what has been laid out by scholars of the politics of memory: 
that prejudice, implicit assumptions, power, and political desire have as much to do 
with the cultural and legal landscape as do historical fact, reason, and logic. The same 
is clearly the case with the law and practice of marital names, which have been—and in 
some ways still are—based on moral sentiment, habit, prejudice, and stereotype. Over 
and above that, the guiding sentiments are founded on a flawed view of historical practice 
and tradition. Historical events related to women have been eradicated from collective 
memory, reinforcing and justifying a dominant status quo that eliminated the rights and 
identity of women. In discarding the historical narrative, a powerful “tradition” replaced it 
that was not, in fact, traditional at all, but rooted itself so deeply it still remains one of the 
most commonly expected gender-specific practices of modern times.
h/2449-h.htm [https://perma.cc/VFE2-LMRV].
